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In the literature on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, not enough attention has been directed to the similarities between Bohr’s
views on quantum mechanics and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Too often,
the connection is either ignored, downplayed, or denied outright. This has,
as far as a proper understanding of Bohr’s views is concerned, been detrimen-
tal, for it has contributed to the common misconception of Bohr as either
a positivist or a pragmatist thinker.1 In recent years, however, there has
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1Baggot (2004), for example, does not mention Kant at all in relation to Bohr. Folse
been a growing number of commentators attentive enough to note the im-
portant affinities in the views of these two thinkers (for instance, Honner
1982, MacKinnon 1982, Shimony 1983, Kaiser 1992, Chevalley 1994, Faye
2008). All of these commentators are, I believe, correct; however the picture
they present to us of the connections between Bohr and Kant is one that is
painted in broad strokes. It is open to the criticism that these affinities are
merely superficial.
The contribution that I intend to make in this essay, therefore, is to
provide a closer, structural, analysis of both Bohr’s and Kant’s views that
makes these connections more explicit. In particular, I will demonstrate the
similarities between Bohr’s argument, on the one hand, that neither the wave
nor the particle description of atomic phenomena pick out an object in the
ordinary sense of the word, and Kant’s requirement, on the other hand, that
both ‘mathematical’ (having to do with magnitude) and ‘dynamical’ (having
to do with an object’s interaction with other objects) principles must be
applicable to appearances in order for us to determine them as objects of
experience. I will argue that Bohr’s ‘Complementarity interpretation’ of
quantum mechanics, which views atomic objects as idealizations, and which
licenses the repeal of the principle of causality for the domain of atomic
physics, is perfectly compatible with, and indeed follows naturally from a
broadly Kantian epistemological framework.
There are exegetical difficulties with respect to both Bohr and Kant.
Their writings are dense and are considered to be obscure by many. Inter-
preting Kant has become something of an industry in philosophy. As for
Bohr, J.S. Bell writes of him: “While imagining that I understand the po-
sition of Einstein ... I have very little understanding of the position of his
principal opponent, Bohr.” (2004 [1981], p. 155). Abner Shimony writes: “I
must confess that after 25 years of attentive—and even reverent—reading of
Bohr, I have not found a consistent and comprehensive framework for the
interpretation of quantum mechanics.” (1985, p. 109). I do not pretend
to have succeeded, where these and other eminent physicists and philoso-
phers have failed, in resolving all of the problems that go along with giving
a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of Bohr’s philosophical posi-
tion. Bohr is known to have thought highly of the Pragmatist philosophy of
(1985), on the other hand, flatly denies any similarities whatsoever that are not merely
superficial. Baggot and Folse both view Bohr as a pragmatist. For examples of positivist
construals of Bohr, see: Popper (1982), Bunge (1955a,b).
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William James, and Bohr’s philosophy represents, in all likelihood, a com-
bination of Jamesian and Kantian strands (although even this is likely an
oversimplification). In this essay it is the Kantian aspects of Bohr’s views
that I will focus on; I do not, however, believe this is the whole story.2
Understanding the Kantian aspects of Bohr’s thought is important be-
cause, although Bohr’s and Kant’s philosophies do diverge ultimately, they
nevertheless share (as I will argue) a common epistemological framework.
Any interpretation of Bohr should, therefore, start with Kant. Further, com-
paring Kant and Bohr is also invaluable for our interpretation of Kant. By
asking the question ‘how can a Kantian make sense of quantum mechanics?’,
one gains valuable insight into the implications of the principles of quantum
mechanics for Kantian philosophy—in particular, what the uncertainty rela-
tions, if accepted, entail for the applicability of Kant’s principle of cause and
effect.
The essay is structured as follows: section 1 is devoted to a discussion of
Kant’s characterization of objective cognition. In section 2, I review the his-
tory of quantum theory up to Heisenberg’s development of the Uncertainty
Principle. In section 3, I give an analysis of Bohr’s arguments for Comple-
mentarity, and discuss the Kantian aspects of Complementarity in section
4. Finally, in section 5, I deal with some possible objections to my interpre-
tation of Bohr. For those already familiar with Kantian philosophy and/or
the early history of quantum mechanics, sections 1 and 2 may be skimmed
over (or skipped) without disastrous results, and referred to as needed for
clarification of the exposition that follows in sections 3 and 4.
1 The Kantian Framework
For Kant, there are two aspects to experience: on the one hand, there are
intuitions. We subsume these intuitions, on the other hand, under concepts.
Intuitions are mediated by sensibility : our mind’s capacity to be affected
by objects (CPR, A19/B33). The effect, on our sensibility, of some object
is the sensation of that object, and empirical intuition is that aspect of an
intuition that is associated with this sensation.
An appearance is “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition”
(CPR, A20/B34) (for example, consider a person in a dark room who sees
a shape against the far wall, but only after some scrutiny determines that
2For more on Bohr and William James, see, e.g, Folse (1985, p. 49-51).
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shape to be a chair. Before determining it to be a chair, the person is
puzzled as to what it is: we can say that the person views it merely as
the appearance of something indeterminate).3 There are two aspects to an
appearance. First, there is its matter : what we sense. Second, there is its
form. This is how the matter is related, both to itself and to the subject.
The two forms of appearances are: space, for outer appearances, and time,
for both inner and outer appearances. As forms of appearances, they are
the formal conditions for appearances; they are a priori (in a logical, not
a temporal, sense), i.e., they are the necessary relations according to which
sensations must be ordered in our mind (CPR, A20/B34).
So much for intuition. Concepts of the understanding, now, correspond
to rules for synthesizing the manifold of intuition. For example, an empirical
concept (e.g., a horse) corresponds to a rule according to which this bushy
tail, that long nose, that mane, and those hoofs can be associated in one
representation. When we synthesize, i.e., combine, some particular manifold
of intuition according to the particular rule for a concept, we say that this
manifold of intuition has been subsumed under the concept. Now a pure
concept of the understanding (a ‘category’) is one of a set of meta-concepts
that all empirical concepts necessarily presuppose. Like the pure forms of
intuition, these categories are a priori.4
Associated with the categories are formal principles for their application
to possible experience. Among these, Kant distinguishes between mathe-
matical and dynamical principles for the possibility of experience (CPR,
B198-B294).5 The former are constitutive for appearances. They are nec-
essary principles for the possibility of presenting an appearance to ourselves
as existing. These say that in order for anything to appear to us, it must be
apprehended as having, determinately, both an extensive (length, breadth,
etc.) and an intensive magnitude (i.e., a degree). But that something ap-
pears to us as existing is, by itself, not enough to determine this something
as an object. To determine this appearance as an object, we must apply the
dynamical principles to it. The dynamical principles are not constitutive
3For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Harper (1984, p. 110-111).
4For a list, CPR, A80/B106.
5The mathematical principles are the Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Per-
ception; the dynamical principles are the Analogies of experience and the Postulates of
empirical thought as such. As the Postulates do not have a direct bearing on our discussion,
I will leave them aside here and focus exclusively on the Analogies.
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but regulative.6 They are principles, not for the apprehension, but for the
connection of appearances in time; they presuppose that an appearance has
already been apprehended in accordance with the mathematical principles.
These dynamical principles state, first, that all change presupposes some-
thing permanent; second, that all change must occur according to the law of
cause and effect; third, that all substances that are perceived as simultane-
ous are in mutual interaction. To determine an appearance as an object of
a possible experience, therefore, we require that at a determinate instant in
time, it has a determinate position in space (determined by the mathematical
principles) and that there is a law (subject to the dynamical principles) by
which it dynamically interacts with other objects.
In particular, the principle of causality tells us, according to Kant, that
in order to cognize change in some object, there must be a rule by which we
objectively associate our perceptions of the object through time; i.e., some
objective ordering of our perceptions such that the state of the object at
some moment in time is presented as being in a determinate relation with
the states of the object at other times. To illustrate: suppose I lean against
a fence at the bank of a river, and watch a log as it is carried downstream by
the current.7 At time t1, I watch as it comes into view from around the bend
in the river some yards upstream. I then daydream for a while. Eventually,
I notice (t2) that the log has travelled some distance from the place where I
first spotted it. At t3, I recall to myself the motion of the log down the river
that I half-consciously observed while daydreaming, after which I continue
to watch the log as it disappears into the forest (t4). Later that afternoon, I
recall that what aroused me from my daydream was a sparrow alighting on
the log (t5). If we list these representations in the order in which they are
actually perceived, then this is a subjective ordering :
t1, t2, t3, t4, t5
I can also give these perceptions an objective ordering, however, according to
which the motion of the log must have actually proceeded in time:
t1, t3, t5, t2, t4
6This sense of regulative should not be confused with the sense that Kant uses with
respect to the ‘ideas of reason’. There the distinction is between that which is constitutive
or regulative with respect to experience as a whole. Here, he uses regulative not in the
context of experience in general, but in the context of particular objects of experience.
7This is a variation on Kant’s example of the ship (Cf. CPR, B236-238).
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To determine this objective ordering, I must take into account the position
of the log in the river during each of my perceptions, as well as anything else
that is relevant to the motion of the log. The particular rule of succession
for the change of state of the log is something that can only be discovered
empirically (e.g., by determining which way the river is flowing). However,
that there is some rule to be discovered is what the principle of causality tells
us. This is a priori, according to Kant.
Now, for Kant, the presentations of time and space are continuous, in-
finitely divisible, quantities (CPR, B211). No matter how small, every ‘piece’
of space or time always presupposes a possible further intuition of space or
time within its boundaries. The principle of cause and effect, now, tells
us that every series of perceptions has some objective ordering according
to which it progresses in time. But since time is infinitely divisible, so is
the progression of perceptions (CPR, B255). All change associated with a
possible experience is continuous, therefore, and we can know this a priori,
according to Kant.
Kant’s views were highly influential among both scientists and philoso-
phers, especially in the latter half of the 19th century. In the 20th century,
however, the development of Special and General Relativity, and the develop-
ment of Quantum Mechanics undermined Kant’s views in the eyes of many.
Relativity theory called into question the a priori status of space and time;
Quantum Mechanics called into question the a priori status of both space
and time and the principle of causality. It is to the latter theory that we now
turn.
2 The Genesis of Quantum Mechanics
When certain substances are subjected to extremely high temperatures, they
absorb energy and emit light (picture a blacksmith hammering metal in a
forge; if the temperature is high enough, the metal becomes ‘red hot’ or
‘white hot’). To study this phenomenon, 19th century physicists conceived
of the notion of a ‘black body’: a completely non-reflecting object capable
of emitting radiation at an intensity directly proportional to the amount of
energy it absorbs. In 1859-60, Kirchoff was able to show that the ratio of
emitted to absorbed energy in these materials depended solely on frequency
and temperature (and not on, e.g., the body’s shape).
At the turn of the century, Planck hypothesized that the total energy
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of the system was distributed over a large collection of indistinguishable en-
ergy elements. The result was the now famous formula: ε = hν. That is,
the energy, ε, in each element is equal to the constant of proportionality,
h (Planck’s constant), times the frequency, ν. His results implied that ε
must be given in integer multiples of hν. This was unprecedented (in classi-
cal physics, physical quantities change continuously with time). Heisenberg
speculates:
... he must soon have found that his formula looked as if the
oscillator could only contain discrete quanta of energy—a result
that was so different from anything known in classical physics
that he certainly must have refused to believe it in the begin-
ning. ... Planck must have realized at this time that his for-
mula had touched the foundations of our description of nature ...
(Heisenberg, 1959, p. 35).
The discovery of Planck’s constant (the ‘quantum of action’) was key to
the resolution of some other outstanding problems in physics at the time. In
1905, Einstein described light in terms of energy quanta. He later did the
same for atoms and ions. In 1913, Bohr’s theory of the atom was published,
according to which electrons are confined to fixed orbits that depend on ‘prin-
cipal quantum numbers’. In his PhD thesis of 1924, de Broglie demonstrated
the wave-particle duality of matter by relating Planck’s relation ε = hν with
Einstein’s mass-energy equivalence relation, ε = mc2.
Schro¨dinger developed his famous wave function for the evolution of a
quantum mechanical system in 1925. Its interpretation was the subject of
some debate. On Schro¨dinger’s view, the wave function represented a real
disturbance in the electromagnetic field; elementary ‘particles’ were really
just electromagnetic waves of different amplitudes, phases, and frequencies,
which when superimposed, resulted in large, localized, waves (called ‘pack-
ets’) which gave the impression of particles moving through space and time.
As Lorentz pointed out, however, wave packets persist only when they are
large compared with their wavelength. When confined to small regions of
space, wave packets, unlike elementary particles, disperse rapidly (Cf. Moore,
1992, pp. 214-217).
Heisenberg wrote his famous uncertainty paper in 1927, in which he ar-
gued for the in principle impossibility of precisely determining both the posi-
tion and momentum of an elementary particle at any one time. Presupposing
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a particle interpretation of elementary objects, he presented the following
thought experiment: imagine we wish to determine the position and momen-
tum of an electron as it travels under a microscope. To determine position,
we use high-frequency γ-rays, since the resolving power of the microscope
is directly proportional to the frequency of the beam. Frequency, however,
is directly proportional to energy. Now when a high energy photon (a light
particle) collides with an electron, the electron is knocked off its path (the
‘Compton effect’). But this means that making an accurate determination
of the electron’s position renders us incapable of accurately determining its
momentum: to determine its momentum we require the position of the elec-
tron at two points along its path, but since the path has been altered by the
first position determination, we cannot determine where the electron would
have been had we not interfered with it.
We can avoid the Compton effect by using low frequency γ-rays. But
recall that the resolving power of the microscope is directly proportional to
the frequency of the beam. If we use low frequency photons to measure the
momentum of the electron, then we lose the ability to measure its position
accurately. Heisenberg showed, mathematically, that an exact determination
of the position of the electron resulted in an infinite uncertainty in its velocity
(and hence momentum), and vice versa (he also demonstrated an analogous
uncertainty relationship between energy and time). In other words, the more
certain we are of one parameter, the less certain we are of the other. In
the limit, i.e., as the uncertainty in the determination of one parameter
approaches 0, the uncertainty in the determination of the other parameter
approaches infinity.
3 Complementarity
Bohr accepted the validity of the uncertainty relations, but disagreed with
Heisenberg over their significance. For (the young) Heisenberg, the uncer-
tainty relations represent an epistemic limitation on what we can know of
some object; we presuppose, however, that in spite of this limitation, the ob-
ject is perfectly determinate in itself—that it is a particle, in fact. For Bohr
the significance of the uncertainty relations is deeper; it is not epistemic in
this sense but rather conceptual. For Bohr the uncertainty relations express
the fact that the fundamental ‘classical concepts’ which both the particle and
wave description of elementary objects presuppose (spatiotemporal concepts,
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on the one hand, and dynamical concepts, on the other) are inapplicable in
the atomic domain, and that therefore a definition of the object in terms of
these parameters is precluded. Let us work our way towards this conclusion.
In his Como paper, Bohr writes:
... [quantum theory’s] essence may be expressed in the so-called
quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an
essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign
to the classical theories and symbolised by Planck’s quantum of
action. (1928, p. 580).
Contrasted with the classical theories, here, is the irreducibly ‘discrete’
nature of atomic processes; the fact that, according to quantum theory, the
observed state of an elementary object changes discontinuously with time.
What this implies, Bohr goes on to say, is that in our observations of the
results of experiments, the interaction with the ‘agency of observation’ (i.e.,
the experimental apparatus) is an ineliminable part of our description of
phenomena (in his later writings, Bohr calls this an “essential wholeness.”
Cf. 1958b, p. 72).
That last step may seem like an inferential leap, but it is comprehensible
in light of our earlier discussion of Kant. We, saw, with Kant, how the infinite
divisibility of time implies that all change must be continuous. Bohr’s argu-
ment tacitly makes use of this assumption. Thus, on the classical conception
of nature, change is continuous. Yet the state transitions of elementary ob-
jects are irreducibly discontinuous. It follows from this that, from a classical
point of view, something is ‘missing’ from our description. What is ‘missing’,
according to Bohr, is a clean distinction between the experimental apparatus
and the object of our investigations; the ‘agency of observation’ is, in some
sense, a part of what we observe.
Is it the case, then, that quantum mechanical descriptions of phenomena
are not objective? No, quantum mechanical descriptions of phenomena, like
classical descriptions, are objective. However what is different is that for
the classical (but not for the quantum) case it is always possible to deter-
minately describe (and correct for) the interaction between apparatus and
object. Suppose I wish to describe a fish swimming in the water below my
motorboat. There are three components involved in my description: first,
there is the apparatus (my eyes); second, there is the object (the fish); third,
there is the interaction between my eyes and the fish. We describe this last
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component by means of light rays that reflect off the fish and travel through
water, then air, and finally into my eyes. Now when I look at the fish, it
appears displaced from its actual position in the water due to the refraction
of the ray. However, in my description of the fish, I am able to describe
the interaction between my eyes and the fish and I am able to compensate
for this interaction in my description; I am, at least vaguely, aware of the
laws for the refraction of light, and taking these into account, I am able to
determine the actual position of the fish, as well as its movements, with rea-
sonable certainty; I am able to distinguish the fish ‘as it really is’ (the object)
from the fish as it appears (the phenomenon). But this is not possible for
atomic phenomena. Although we must make some ‘subject-object’ distinc-
tion—some ‘cut’ in what we observe—it is an arbitrary cut—one in which
the interaction between apparatus and object cannot be disentangled from
our description of the object.
One might object that there is some arbitrariness to the cut we make in
the classical realm as well; a geologist and an archaeologist, for instance, will
have distinct objects of inquiry even though both observe the same physi-
cal stone. What is different is that in the classical case, as we correct for
the interaction with the apparatus in our description of the object, we are
constrained by the (according to Bohr) criteria for its independent reality:
a precise location in space-time and a precise account of its interaction with
other objects. In the quantum case, however, we cannot account for the
interaction with the apparatus in a way that leaves the object with definite
position/time and momentum/energy parameters. Our language neverthe-
less requires some distinction, so we arbitrarily impose one.
Bohr expresses all of the foregoing in the following concise paragraph:
Now the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic
phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of obser-
vation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality
in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phe-
nomena nor to the agencies of observation. After all, the concept
of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends upon which ob-
jects are included in the system to be observed. Ultimately every
observation can of course be reduced to our sense perceptions.
The circumstance, however, that in interpreting observations use
has always to be made of theoretical notions, entails that for ev-
ery particular case it is a question of convenience at what point
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the concept of observation involving the quantum postulate with
its inherent ‘irrationality’ is brought in. This situation has far-
reaching consequences. On one hand, the definition of the state
of a physical system, as ordinarily understood, claims the elim-
ination of all external disturbances. But in that case, according
to the quantum postulate, any observation will be impossible,
and above all, the concepts of space and time lose their imme-
diate sense. On the other hand, if in order to make observation
possible we permit certain interactions with suitable agencies of
measurement, not belonging to the system, an unambiguous def-
inition of the state of the system is naturally no longer possible,
... (1928, p. 580).
Bohr must still explain exactly why the classical concepts are not appli-
cable to elementary objects. He writes:
The fundamental contrast between the quantum of action and
the classical concepts is immediately apparent from the simple
formulae which form the common foundation of the theory of light
quanta and of the wave theory of material particles. If Planck’s
constant be denoted by h, as is well known,
Eτ = Iλ = h, . . . (1)
where E and I are energy and momentum respectively, τ and λ
the corresponding period of vibration and wave-length. In these
formulae the two notions of light and also of matter enter in sharp
contrast. While energy and momentum are associated with the
concept of particles, and hence may be characterised according
to the classical point of view by definite space-time co-ordinates,
the period of vibration and wave-length refer to a plane harmonic
wave train of unlimited extent in space and time. (1928, p. 581).
In other words, in each case (i.e., for light and matter), Planck’s con-
stant relates two incompatible quantities. In the first relation, E (energy) is
associated with the concept of a particle given with definite spatiotemporal
coordinates, while τ (period of vibration) is associated with a wave-train ‘of
unlimited extent’, not conceptualizable with respect to definite space-time
coordinates. The case is the same for I and λ.
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To illustrate the concept of a ‘wave-train’, consider the sine function.
An individual wave (e.g., the one delimited by the two dashed lines in the
figure) is a section of this function that stretches from one crest to the one
immediately following it. The wave-train is made up of all the individual
waves, extending infinitely in both directions along the x-axis. Clearly, it is
not located at a particular point in space. Bohr’s point is that it does not
make sense to picture an object to ourselves that is, as the above relations
express, both given at some definite spatiotemporal location and of unlimited
extent in space and time. Nevertheless, physical theory does provide us with
the resources we need to get around this difficulty, whether we assume a wave
or a particle description of the object. The problem, as we shall see, is that
neither description is precise.
For the case of the wave description, we can do this by using the super-
position principle. Bohr writes:
Only with the aid of the superposition principle does it become
possible to obtain a connexion with the ordinary mode of de-
scription. Indeed, a limitation of the extent of the wave-fields
in space and time can always be regarded as resulting from the
interference of a group of elementary harmonic waves. (1928, p.
581).
A boat sailing over a smooth lake creates a wave disturbance behind it.
A second boat, travelling alongside, also creates a disturbance. When the
waves meet they intersect and constructively interfere. The result is one
large, combined, wave. This is called superposition, and the combined wave
is called a wave group. When enough waves are superimposed in just the
right way, the resultant wave group can be very localized, spatiotemporally;
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if it is so localized, then we call the group a wave packet, and we represent
the velocity of the wave packet by its group velocity. This is what is behind
Schro¨dinger’s picture of a wave, manifesting particle-like properties, moving
through space and time. However, although the superposition principle en-
ables us to construct a description of an object in this way, it necessarily
involves an element of indeterminacy with regard to that object.
Rigorously speaking, a limited wave-field can only be obtained
by the superposition of a manifold of elementary waves corre-
sponding to all the values of ν and σx, σy, σz. But the order of
magnitude of the mean difference between these values for two
elementary waves in the group is given in the most favourable
case by the condition
∆t∆ν = ∆x∆σx = ∆y∆σy = ∆z∆σz = 1 [1a]
where ∆t,∆x,∆y,∆z denote the extension of the wave-field in
time and in the direction of space corresponding to the co-ordinate
axes. (Bohr, 1928, p. 581).
Here, ν refers to the frequency, and σx, σy, σz refer to the wavenumbers for
the elementary waves in the directions of the coordinate axes. Exactly how
the waves constructively (or destructively) interfere depends, in part, on the
wavenumbers/frequencies associated with the individual waves in the wave
group. All else equal, the broader the range of wavenumbers in the group,
the more spatially localized the resultant packet will be, and vice versa. This
is what the expression (1a) is telling us; i.e.,
∆x∆σx = 1
implies : ∆σx =
1
∆x
It is the same for frequency and time. Now, according to the de Broglie
relations, E = h¯ν, I = h¯σ, where E and I are energy and momentum
respectively, and h¯ = h
2pi
is the reduced Planck’s constant. If we multiply
equation (1a) by h¯, this gives us the uncertainty relations:
∆t∆E = ∆x∆Ix = ∆y∆Iy = ∆z∆Iz = h¯ (2)
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which give the upper bound on the accuracy of momentum/position deter-
minations with respect to the wave-field.
Thus, as the wave-field associated with the object gets smaller —as we
‘zoom in’, so to speak, on its position and time coordinates—the possibility
of precisely defining the energy and momentum associated with the object
decreases in proportion. And the opposite is also true: in order to determine
the object’s momentum (or energy), we require a larger wave-field—we need
to ‘zoom out’—but this foregoes a precise determination of the object’s posi-
tion. ‘Zooming in’ and ‘zooming out’, however, are associated with different
experimental arrangements. For the case of the γ-ray microscope, they are
associated with the finite size of the microscope’s aperture; the uncertainty
in the position and momentum of the electron arises, not because of the in-
teraction between two determinate entities (a photon and an electron), but
rather because certain experimental arrangements, well-suited for precisely
determining momentum, preclude the definition of the object in terms of
continuously changing spatiotemporal coordinates, and vice versa.
Indeed, a discontinuous change of energy and momentum during
observation could not prevent us from ascribing accurate values to
the space-time co-ordinates, as well as to the momentum-energy
components before and after the process. The reciprocal uncer-
tainty which always affects the values of these quantities is, as will
be clear from the preceding analysis, essentially an outcome of the
limited accuracy with which changes in energy and momentum
can be defined, when the wave-fields used for the determination of
the space-time co-ordinates of the particle are sufficiently small.
(Bohr, 1928, p. 583).
Thus no one experimental setup allows for an exact definition of the object
in terms of both quantities. One experiment can, at most, give us a picture
of “unsharply defined individuals within finite space-time regions.” (Bohr,
1928, p. 582).
Now let us see if we will have better luck if we begin, instead, with a
particle description of the elementary object. Here, let us consider two dif-
ferent experimental arrangements, both variations of a ‘one-slit’ experiment,
where we direct a photon at a thin diaphragm (a metal plate) into which
an opening, or ‘slit’, has been made. On the other side of the diaphragm is
a photographic plate which registers the light pattern that results. In one
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version of the experiment, designed to detect the particle’s momentum, the
diaphragm is not rigidly attached to the experimental apparatus, i.e., upon
collision with the particle, the diaphragm will recoil slightly. When we direct
the photon at the diaphragm, as it passes through the slit it will exchange
momentum with the apparatus, which we can measure by the amount of re-
coil we observe in the diaphragm. However the recoil of the diaphragm gives
rise to a corresponding uncertainty with regard to the position of the particle
as it passes through the slit (the recoil of the diaphragm makes it impossible
to precisely determine the location of the slit, and hence the particle, at the
moment of impact):
... we lose, on account of the uncontrollable displacement of the
diaphragm during each collision process with the test bodies, the
knowledge of its position when the particle passed through the
slit. (Bohr, 1935, p. 698).
On the other hand, suppose the diaphragm is rigidly fixed to the rest of
the apparatus. In this case, as the photon passes through the slit, whatever
momentum it exchanges with the diaphragm is completely absorbed by the
apparatus—we thus lose the ability to make use of this momentum value in
order to predict the location of the particle’s impact on the photographic
plate. Like the case for the wave picture, then, we have on our hands two ex-
perimental arrangements, one of which is compatible with a precise position
determination; the other compatible with a precise momentum determina-
tion; however each of these excludes the other.
4 A Kantian View of Complementarity
Let us stop and reflect; consider the result of some experiment, say the
mark on a photographic plate. The mark itself is a classical object. It has
definite spatiotemporal coordinates, and it causally interacts in a definite
way with its surroundings. However, this description of the phenomenon—of
the mark as a mark on a photographic plate and nothing more—includes
the photographic plate. To go further and describe the mark as a mark
that has been left by some independently existing object that has interacted
with the plate is what we desire to do, for this allows us to unify the marks
resulting from different experiments as being different manifestations of the
same independently existing object. Our goal is to ‘get at’ reality—the thing
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behind the phenomena—as it exists independently of the conditions of our
experiments. We do this by eliminating the interaction between apparatus
and object from our description of the latter.
Now from a Kantian perspective, in order to describe the object behind
the phenomena as some independently existing8 object of possible experience,
we must ascribe, to the object, first: a determinate position, constrained by
Kant’s mathematical principles: the object must have a definite spatial ex-
tent and degree; second, a determinate momentum or ‘quantity of motion’,
constrained by Kant’s dynamical principles, telling us how the object inter-
acts with its surroundings—in particular, how it changes through time.
To visualise the object, we make use, say, of the superposition principle.
But by this means it is impossible to obtain both an exact position and an
exact momentum determination (likewise for energy and time). It is possible
to obtain an exact position determination, but in that case we completely
forego a determination of the particle’s momentum, and vice versa. We
can, however, get something like a ‘complete’ object (i.e., one in which both
causal and spatiotemporal parameters are present) by making our position
and momentum determinations inexact—“unsharply defined”. But in that
case, although our description is objective, it is no longer the description of an
object of possible experience (i.e., something physically real), for Kant—for
in order for it to be physically real, we must assign determinate values to
both parameters. Instead, the object is what Kant calls a noumenon, or
abstract object.
To clarify: according to Kant, a concept of the understanding must be
understood both in terms of its form and in terms of the content to which
it can be applied. We can think of the form of a concept as analogous to
a mathematical function, e.g., f(x) = 2x + 4. Now a determinate result
can be obtained for this function only if something is filled in for x. By
itself, the function only represents a form for the determination of a variable.
Likewise for a concept: without determinate content, a concept gives us no
determinate cognition. “Without [an object] it has no sense, and is entirely
empty of content, even though it may still contain the logical function for
making a concept out of whatever sort of data there are.” (CPR, B298).
The concept of a noumenon is the concept of something indeterminate—analogous
8I.e., in the sense of its being the same object in different experimental contexts. We can
never abstract, on Kant’s view, completely from the subjective conditions of observation
(space and time), of course.
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to x in the mathematical equation. The function above cannot be applied to
x itself, but only to a value that has been filled in for x. Similarly for con-
cepts: cognition of an object of possible experience requires that a concept
be applied to a determinate, not indeterminate, intuition. A concept of some
causal mechanism corresponds to a rule for the progression of perceptions
in time, and the concepts of the understanding, in general, correspond to
rules that must be applied to our sensible forms of intuition, space and time,
which are always given determinately.
But now consider an elementary particle. According to the uncertainty
relations, it is impossible in principle to describe the particle’s momentum
with any degree of precision without a corresponding loss of precision with re-
gards to its spatiotemporal coordinates. It follows that in order to describe it
using both position/time (spatiotemporal) and momentum/energy (dynam-
ical) parameters, the spatiotemporal parameters associated with it must be
made indeterminate. In fact, both the spatiotemporal and dynamical pa-
rameters must be made indeterminate, but it is the fact that the spatiotem-
poral parameters must be made indeterminate that is the key, for now, on
a Kantian picture, the dynamical principles (whether or not we ascribe de-
terminate dynamical parameters) are strictly speaking no longer applicable,
for the dynamical principles always presuppose a determinate appearance in
space and time apprehended in accordance with the mathematical principles.
The upshot of all of this is that since there is no determinate spatiotempo-
ral magnitude to apply the dynamical principles to, we cannot complete our
description of the object according to the Kantian criteria for objects of pos-
sible experience. Therefore the ‘object’ corresponding to our description, on
Kant’s view, is not physically real.
Bohr reaches the same conclusion regarding the physical reality of our
descriptions of elementary objects:
... a sentence like “we cannot know both the momentum and the
position of an atomic object” raises at once questions as to the
physical reality of two such attributes of the object, which can be
answered only by referring to the conditions for the unambigu-
ous use of space-time concepts, on the one hand, and dynamical
conservation laws, on the other hand. (1949, p. 211).
The issue is not the existence of atomic objects as such (it is undeni-
able that something gives rise to the phenomena we observe), but whether
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our fundamental spatiotemporal and dynamical concepts are literally appli-
cable to them. Evidently, according to both Bohr and Kant, they are not.
And yet these ‘ordinary’ concepts, for Bohr, are also necessary concepts.
The experimental apparatus (a voltmeter, say) is always a piece of classical
equipment which communicates classical information about what we assume
to be (using classical criteria) an independently existing object. The concept
of observation itself, therefore, presupposes the classical concepts.
Here, it must above all be recognized that, however far quan-
tum effects transcend the scope of classical physical analysis, the
account of the experimental arrangement and the record of the
observations must always be expressed in common language sup-
plemented with the terminology of classical physics. (Bohr, 1948,
p. 313).
The main point here is the distinction between the objects under
investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to de-
fine, in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena
appear. (Bohr, 1949, pp. 221-222).
We require the classical concepts, not only to observe, but also to com-
municate experimental results:
... the requirement of communicability of the circumstances and
results of experiments implies that we can speak of well defined
experiences only within the framework of ordinary concepts. (Bohr,
1937, p. 293).
The situation seems hopeless. We require the classical criteria in order
to observe a physical object and to communicate the experience; yet, the
classical criteria cannot fulfil their intended function in the atomic domain,
for they mutually exclude each other. Ironically, it is the uncertainty re-
lations that save us. They guarantee that we can nevertheless achieve a
unified description by ‘patching together’ the mutually exclusive dynamical
and spatiotemporal descriptions of the object under different experimental
conditions. “The apparently incompatible sorts of information about the
behaviour of the object under examination which we get by different exper-
imental arrangements can clearly not be brought into connection with each
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other in the usual way, but may, as equally essential for an exhaustive account
of all experience, be regarded as “complementary” to each other.” (Bohr,
1937, p. 291). The uncertainty relations guarantee that a causal description
can never contradict a spatiotemporal description—that the two can be used
in a complementary way—for any experiment intended to determinately es-
tablish the object’s spatiotemporal coordinates can tell us nothing about its
dynamical parameters, and vice versa.
the proper roˆle of the indeterminacy relations consists in assuring
quantitatively the logical compatibility of apparently contradic-
tory laws which appear when we use two different experimental
arrangements, of which only one permits an unambiguous use of
the concept of position, while only the other permits the applica-
tion of the concept of momentum ... (Bohr, 1937, p. 293).
We are not licensed, however, to take the next step and ascribe physical
reality to this ‘patched together’ object of our descriptions, for the object is
not real but abstract, and its classical attributes are idealizations.
From the above considerations it should be clear that the whole
situation in atomic physics deprives of all meaning such inherent
attributes as the idealizations of classical physics would ascribe
to the object. (Bohr, 1937, p. 293).
It is not too difficult to make sense of this from a Kantian point of view.
Again, the concept of a noumenon is the key—this time in its positive sig-
nification as an idea, or concept of reason. Kant distinguishes two kinds of
concepts: “Concepts of reason serve for comprehension, just as concepts
of the understanding serve for understanding (of perceptions).” (CPR,
A311/B367).
Concepts of reason, or ideas, have no validity with respect to the cogni-
tion of an object of possible experience—the cognition of such objects must
always refer to determinate (sensible) conditions according to which they can
be given to us in experience. Nevertheless, these concepts can be used reg-
ulatively, to connect the understanding’s concepts—in our case, the various
descriptions of phenomena (the ‘marks’) observed in the context of individ-
ual experiments—together in a coherent way in the context of our overall
experience.
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All other pure concepts the critique relegates to the ideas, which
are transcendent for our theoretical cognitive power, though that
certainly does not make them useless or dispensable, since they
serve as regulative principles: they serve, in part, to restrain
the understanding’s arrogant claims, namely, that (since it can
state a priori the conditions for the possibility of all things it
can cognize) it has thereby circumscribed the area within which
all things in general are possible; in part, they serve to guide
the understanding, in its contemplation of nature, by a principle
of completeness—though the understanding cannot attain this
completeness—and so further the final aim of all cognition. (CJ,
p. 167-168).
The classical concepts, when they transcend possible experience, become
ideas—they become the classical idealizations at the heart of the mechanis-
tic conception of nature. (Cf. CJ, §§69-78). In the realm of atomic physics,
however, these dynamical and spatiotemporal idealizations are incompatible;
we cannot use them to describe a classical object. The uncertainty relations
tell us that a precise determination of one type of parameter entirely excludes
any determination whatsoever of the other type; therefore, they cannot be
used to determine an object of possible experience, which requires a deter-
mination of both. But precisely because they say nothing about the objects
of possible experience in this sense, they are compatible with the objects
of possible experience—the results of our experiments—just so long as we
understand that when we use these ideas in our description of nature it is
only a manner of speaking; we may only speak ‘as if’ these ideas apply to
our observations.
We must be clear that, when it comes to atoms, language can be
used only as poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned
with describing facts as with creating images and establishing
mental connections (Bohr, quoted in: Heisenberg 1971, p. 41).
Those familiar with Kant should immediately recognize the strategy be-
ing employed here. When confronted with other areas (biology and ethics, for
instance) of human inquiry where the mechanistic conception (on his view) is
either inadequate or inappropriate, Kant appeals to his doctrine of the anti-
nomies to show that competing conceptions (e.g., freedom and determinism,
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mechanism and teleology) are merely ideas, and that they are compatible
with each other if treated as such (Cf. CPR, B566-567, B586, CJ, §§69-78).
5 Concerns and Objections
One might object that a Kantian should not feel herself committed to any-
thing like Complementarity, for one may opt to view the uncertainty relations
as an expression of the temporary state of our ignorance with regard to ele-
mentary particles, and not as a final word. This is correct. A Kantian need
not follow Bohr. However, if, as a Kantian, one does accept the uncertainty
relations, then something like Complementarity must be the result—this is
what it was my intention to show in this paper. Indeed, as I have shown, it
is because one starts from within the Kantian framework that the motiva-
tion for Complementarity arises. It is unclear what Kant himself would have
thought, but the following discussion of the mechanistic versus the teleolog-
ical conceptions of nature may give us a clue.
... I ought always to reflect on these events and forms in terms of
the principle of the mere mechanism of nature, and hence ought
to investigate this principle as far as I can, because unless we
presuppose it in our investigation [of nature] we can have no cog-
nition of nature at all in the proper sense of the term. But none of
this goes against the second maxim—that on certain occasions, in
dealing with certain natural forms (and, on their prompting, even
with all of nature), we should probe these and reflect on them in
terms of a principle that differs entirely from an explanation in
terms of the mechanism of nature ... (CJ, p. 387-388).
Although both the mechanistic and the teleological conceptions are thought
of as ‘complementary’ ideas which guide our investigation of nature, priority
is clearly given, nevertheless, to the mechanistic conception. The use of the
teleological conception is reserved only for ‘certain occasions’ in which the
mechanistic conception is either inapplicable (perhaps only temporarily) or
inappropriate. It is likely that Kant would have been more conservative than
Bohr, i.e., that he would not have accepted the uncertainty relations as final.
In that case, one way to interpret Bohr’s Complementarity doctrine is as
an attempted refutation of what he took to be Kantian philosophy, with its
overemphasis on the mechanistic conception of nature. Indeed, this is one
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way to reconcile Bohr’s oft-cited criticisms of ‘a priorism’ (Cf. Folse 1985,
pp. 217-221) with his insistence on the bedrock-like status of the classical
concepts.
Potentially problematic for my reading, however, are statements like the
following: “... no experience is definable without a logical frame and ... any
apparent disharmony can be removed only by an appropriate widening of the
conceptual framework.” (Bohr, 1958b, p. 82), which lead Kaiser to write, of
Bohr’s view:
... there is also a very un-Kantian sentiment expressed in the end
of Bohr’s quotation: our formal frame might need to be altered.
... Kant viewed this formal frame, which includes the forms of
intuition and the categories, as a priori and unalterable. Bohr
followed a two-faculty format but he rejected a priorism. (Kaiser,
1992, pp. 222-223)
Yet Kaiser’s interpretation is misleading, at best, for it seems to con-
flate Bohr’s view with Heisenberg’s. Heisenberg maintained that the gradual
evolution of scientific concepts (or even the human species) would allow us
to transcend our limitation to the classical concepts (Cf. Heisenberg 1959,
p. 83, Heisenberg 1971, p. 124). This was not Bohr’s view: “... it would
be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may
be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new
conceptual forms.” (1934, p. 16). And again:
We must, in fact, realise that the unambiguous interpretation
of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of the
classical physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the
language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of
physicists for all time. (1931, p. 692).
What Bohr means by ‘widening’, then, is not a fundamental alteration of
our basic conceptual framework, but an imaginative use of our framework’s
own resources in order to extend its reach. “Indeed, the development of
atomic physics has taught us how, without leaving common language, it is
possible to create a framework sufficiently wide for an exhaustive description
of new experience.” (1958a, p. 88, emphasis mine).
Specifically related to Kant, Folse objects that Kant was a ‘subjectivist’
philosopher, while Bohr’s intention was to provide an objective description
of experience. Folse writes:
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These facts have given rise to the view held by some of the most
perceptive of Bohr’s interpreters that his position contains Kan-
tian elements supporting a subjectivistic reading of complemen-
tarity. Since Bohr specifically stated complementarity provides
an objective description of experience, it would seem that virtu-
ally any such reading would be contrary to his intent ... (Folse,
1985, p. 217).
But this misinterprets Kant. Kant’s theoretical philosophy, as we have
seen, revolves around the question of how to give an objective description
of experience; thus he takes great pains, for instance, to distinguish the
objective succession of appearances from the subjective one. If not ascribing
to na¨ıve realism amounts to being a subjectivist then Kant is guilty on all
counts, however I do not think this is the type of subjectivism that Folse
is referring to, for Bohr would be guilty of this charge as well. For Kant,
possible experience is constrained by the forms of our intuition, space and
time, and by the concepts by which we are able to combine these intuitions
into one representation of an object. But this is no different from Bohr’s
insistence that we require classical concepts for the unambiguous description
of experience.
Bohr was known to have admired the work of the American pragmatist
William James, and this has been taken by Folse (Folse 1985, p. 49-51, Folse
1985, pp. 217-221) to tell against a Kantian influence on Bohr, for James was
sharply critical of Kant. As Kaiser points out, however, James’ criticisms of
Kant are all directed at Kant’s a priorism and not at the other aspects of his
philosophy. This is perfectly compatible with a picture of Bohr as accepting
certain aspects of Kant’s philosophy while rejecting others. It is certainly not
without precedent for one philosopher to be influenced by two rivals: Kant
himself was strongly influenced by both Newton and Leibniz; their rivalry
did not stop him from incorporating aspects of both of their views into his
own.
Indeed, many philosophers have borrowed from Kant without making
themselves into carbon copies. The Neo-Kantian philosopher, Ernst Cas-
sirer, for instance, rejects the a priori status of Kant’s classical concepts
(1956 [1936], pp. 194-195) while still maintaining a broadly Kantian epis-
temology; the intuitionist mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer was strongly in-
fluenced by Kant—Brouwer, like Kant, founds arithmetic on the pure in-
tuition of time—yet Brouwer rejects the pure intuition of space in light of
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the development of non-Euclidean geometry. Both Reichenbach and Carnap
began their careers as Neo-Kantians before turning towards logical empiri-
cism in light of the developments in geometry and logic (Friedman, 2000;
Glymour & Eberhardt, 2008). Frege, throughout his career, though critical
of Kant’s views on arithmetic, nevertheless believed Kant to be correct for
the case of geometry, even in the wake of the modern developments.9 Af-
ter mercilessly skewering most of his own contemporaries and predecessors,
Frege writes, of Kant: “I have no wish to incur the reproach of picking petty
quarrels with a genius to whom we must all look up with grateful awe; I feel
bound, therefore, to call attention also to the extent of my agreement with
him, which far exceeds any disagreement.” (Frege, 1980, §89). Brouwer’s
arch-rival, Hilbert, was also influenced by Kant. Hilbert, in the epigraph to
his Foundations of Geometry, quotes Kant: “All human knowledge begins
with intuitions, thence passes to concepts and ends with ideas.” (Hilbert,
1902). All of these thinkers incorporated parts of Kantian philosophy into
their own. Bohr was a contemporary of all of these men; further, he had ac-
cess to Kantian ideas through his lifelong friend and mentor, Harald Høffding,
who was something of a Kant scholar. Consider Høffding’s analysis of Kan-
tian philosophy, in light of our discussion of Complementarity:
Experience not only implies that we conceive something in space
and time, but likewise that we are able to combine what is given in
space and time in a definite way, i.e. as indicated in the concepts
of magnitude and causality. This is the only means of distinguish-
ing between experience and mere representation or imagination.
All extensive and intensive changes must proceed continuously,
i.e. through every possible degree of extension and intensity, oth-
erwise we could never be certain of having any real experience.
Gaps and breaks must be impossible (non datur hiatus non datur
saltus). The origin of each particular phenomenon moreover must
be conditioned by certain other phenomena, ... Wherever there
appear to be gaps in the series of perceptions we assume that
further investigation will discover the intervening members. This
demonstration of the validity of the categories of magnitude and
causality likewise involves a limitation: The validity of the cat-
egories can only be affirmed within the range of possible expe-
rience; they cannot be applied to things which from their very
9Cf. Merrick (2006) for more on the relation between Kant and Frege.
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nature cannot become objects of experience. (Høffding, 1922,
147-148).
A last objection that I will address, before concluding, is with regards
to the common misconception of Bohr as a positivist. This conception of
Bohr has been popularised by, among others, Karl Popper and Mario Bunge.
I will not spend much time answering it here. In addition to directing the
interested reader to Don Howard’s illuminating article (2004) on the subject, I
will simply point out that this is a view that Bohr (as quoted by Heisenberg)
explicitly denied: “Positivist insistence on conceptual clarity is, of course,
something I fully endorse, but their prohibition of any discussion of the wider
issues, simply because we lack clear-cut enough concepts in this realm, does
not seem very useful to me—this same ban would prevent our understanding
of quantum theory.” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 208).
One may, of course, ignore Bohr’s own words here and presume to un-
derstand him better than he understood himself. If one were to make such a
claim, it would not be objectionable as such; however, given the current, and
widely acknowledged, dearth of understanding with respect to Bohr’s views
on quantum mechanics, such a presumption should be regarded as highly
dubious.
In this paper I have highlighted the parallels between Bohr’s doctrine
of Complementarity and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. We have seen how
Bohr’s principle of complementarity and Kant’s theoretical philosophy are
common in their approach: that both approaches are centred around what
each thinker took to be the limits of objective experience. We have seen
how, in order to transcend these limits, Bohr appealed to what a Kantian
would call noumena in the positive sense, or ideas of reason. We have seen
how a Kantian (who does not deny the validity of the uncertainty relations),
starting from the principles of Kantian philosophy, would be led to many of
the same conclusions as Bohr. Finally, we have seen how the objections to
the link between the two thinkers rest on either a misinterpretation of Kant,
or on a misrepresentation of Bohr, or both.
Complementarity is the natural outcome of a broadly Kantian episte-
mological framework and a Kantian approach to natural science, conjoined
with Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. There is a very strong similarity in
spirit, if not in technical detail, between Bohr’s and Kant’s approaches to
natural science, and I hope to have inspired the conviction that the further
examination of these similarities (and differences) will lead us to a better
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understanding of both of these men.
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